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Across most developing countries including Pakistan, a common and persisting
demographic phenomenon has been rapid growth in cities. This high degree of urbanization
is reflected by the fact that in the year 2000, out of 21 megacities, with populations in excess
of 10 million people, only two were located in the developed world (Todaro and Smith,
2003). Both high population growth and the ever increasing rural to urban migration, have
led to this unprecedented expansion of urban metropolises. The rate of economic growth
and development within the cities has not kept pace with these adverse demographics
resulting in a deterioration of socio-economic conditions of the population. According to
the latest figures published by the UN Population Division over one third of the urban
population in developing countries inhabit shanty towns and slums, where there is no access
to clean water, sewage system, or electricity. In Karachi, for example, it is estimated that
of the 8 million inhabitants about 2.5 million are squatters, living in 350 ‘katchi abadis’1
in the city. This growing economic deprivation and inequality not only between the rural
and urban sector, but also within urban areas is a source of social unrest and hence
a potential threat for both the economic and political security of the country.
In the case of Pakistan, there has not been any explicit policy initiative towards addressing
the issue of internal migration. In fact, the ever-increasing rate of rural to urban migration
in the country is indicative not only of an urban bias in government policies but also of a
lack of planning and implementation of rural development schemes. According to Karim
and Nasar (2003), the volume of lifetime internal migration in Pakistan from 1951 to 1998
increased almost six times which was twice as much as the increase in the country's
population within the same period. The sluggish growth in farm and non-farm employment
opportunities in rural areas accompanied with an absence of effective subsidy provision
and social safety nets have made the rural poor much more vulnerable to inherent price and
income volatility in the rural sector. Furthermore, lack of access for the small farmer to
formal credit markets, failures to redress land fragmentation and an absence of any political
will or commitment to implement land reforms in areas with both high land ownership
inequality and greater incidence of poverty, have all contributed to the widening of local
and sectoral inequality. The policy biases and failures over the years have led to the systematic
marginalization of the small land-holders, landless tenants and labourers, especially in
interior Sindh, southern Punjab and Balochistan. All this has fueled the process of migration
resulting in the unprecedented increase in the population of large cities such as Karachi,
Rawalpindi and Lahore.
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1Unregulated squatter settlement of migrant families on state land.According to recent estimates about 24% of population growth in the urban areas of
Pakistan is due to migration from the rural hinterland while in Karachi, the largest city in
the country, migration accounts for almost half of the cities’ population increase (Karim
and Nasar, 2003). Fritz Selier (1988), in “Rural-Urban Migration in Pakistan’, aptly describes
the attitude of the government vis-a-vis migration in the following quote:
“To a large degree the authorities in Pakistan have adopted a laissez-faire
attitude (towards migration). In as far as policies were formulated and
pursued, they have strongly discriminated against the poor. In as far as
policies have been adopted which were obviously intended to serve the
interests of the poorer sections of the population, such policies have not
been pursued seriously.”
At the urban end, policy towards migration has been reactive rather than anticipatory.
Instead of taking a proactive role through the provision of housing and residential facilities
with basic public amenities for lower income groups, such as migrants, the government has
waited for slums and squatter settlements to emerge and grow in the periphery of urban
centers. Some of these settlements are later regularized by the government while others,
because of lack of public funds, come under the ambit of private entrepreneurs. Whether
the central reason behind the passive approach of the government in this context is due to
a lack of political will or resources is open to debate. It is however clear that the policy of
'settle first, regularize later' creates huge opportunities for government officials to extract
maximum possible rents from private sector property developers, middlemen and residents
of these illegal settlements(Gazdar, 2003).
An interesting and rather unique example of a proactive government policy is that of
Orangi Township in Karachi, which was specifically developed by the local authorities in
the 60s for low-income groups such as migrants. However, over the years the unabated
flow of migrants from all over the country led to illegal sub divisions of residential plots
and also to the unauthorized expansion of this otherwise regularized township. Most of the
areas of the township are without any public amenities such as sanitation and sewerage,
the disparate provision of which has been left to a private welfare enterprise, the Orangi
Pilot Project.2
As mentioned earlier, a major contributing factor to the process of urbanization and
rural to urban migration has been the urban-biased development policies pursued by the
governments of developing countries including that of Pakistan.3  The intellectual foundation
of these policies were various models of development proposed in the 50's and 60's, all of
which put forward one central ingredient for growth and that was capital accumulation or
industrialization. Hence the `big push' model of development in the 50's, the Harrod-Domar
Model (1946) along with the Lewis Model (1954) led less-developed countries to pursue
policies to foster rapid industrialization and urban development. This urban biased development
process was thought to alleviate the problems of under development and regional inequality
by attracting the surplus labour from the countryside to fuel the process of industrialization
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2For details on the Orangi Township and the Orangi Pilot Project, see Selier (1988), Chapter IV.
3In Pakistan's economic history the Ayub Khan era in the 50s epitomises the urban-industrial bias and the
belief in the trickle down effect.in the urban centres. This seemingly systematic process was supposed to continue till the
wages in both sectors had equalized and the economy had been transformed from agricultural
to a predominantly industrial state. Therefore migration was viewed as a necessary and
positive feature in the transition of a traditional agricultural based economy into a modern
industrial one. Though these policies resulted in respectable GNP growth rates in developing
countries, the problem of urban unemployment, migration, regional inequality and poverty
persisted hence casting a doubt on the degree of applicability and wisdom of these theoretical
models of development.
The change in this theoretical orthodoxy was pioneered by both Harris and Todaro
(1969, 1970). Their model of a dual economy was able to encapsulate the observed
phenomenon of continued rural to urban migration even in the presence of urban
unemployment in developing countries. In their framework, analysis of migration was based
on individual decision, in which, the potential migrant weighed the benefits of migration
in terms of future discounted expected earnings in the urban sector against the costs of
migration which were the foregone wages in the rural sector and the direct costs of migration.
The key feature of their model was the prevalence of equilibrium urban unemployment, a
direct consequence of the minimum wage regulation in the sector. Harris and Todaro
prescribed urban employment subsidies accompanied with the rather politically and socially
unpalatable policy of migration restrictions as an effective policy combination to eradicate
urban unemployment and increase social welfare. Subsequent seminal contribution by
Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1974) and Basu (1980, 97) came up with more realistic optimal
policy alternatives, i.e., rural development along with urban job creation.
The individual decision based Harris Todaro model became the standard framework of
both further theoretical contributions and empirical analysis on migration issues. The basic
assumption of migration being solely an individual decision was never abandoned in most
of its extensions. It was only in the early 80's that the focus of analysis started to undergo
a radical shift. The issue of migration was obviously not restricted to the domain of economics
but had been analyzed both in anthropological and sociological studies. These migration
studies on developing countries suggested that the decision to migrate was primarily a
household one as opposed to just an individual’s. This assertion was corroborated within
economics by empirical studies which suggested a continued link which the individual
migrant or a migrant family maintained with the origin/rural household [see Banerjee
(1981), Stark and Lucas (1985) and Nabi (1986)]. These links took the form of regular
visits to the countryside and a flow of financial transfers or remittances from both migrant
to the rural household or vice -versa. All this implied that ties to the origin are not severed
by the migrants, and, as the decision to migrate has economic repercussions not only on
the migrant but also on the rural household it therefore could not solely and simply be based
on individual decision making. These empirical studies exposed a major caveat in migration
theory and led to the refinement and reformulation of ideas on migration in order to
encompass the complexities of the migration processes in developing countries. Pioneered
by Oded Stark this development in migration literature is often referred to as the New
Economics of Labour Migration (NELM).
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which previously were analyzed separately, in one framework. Migration is viewed as a
rural household's strategy to diversify risk, which consequently leads to the establishment
of a mutual support system between the migrant and the rural-origin household the mechanics
of which, if appealing to self-interest, could be explained by a bargaining process, or, could
be purely based on altruism. Whatever the reasons and nature of the bi-lateral income
support the migrants in the urban sector can be viewed as an extension or a `satellite' of
the rural household [Caces, (1985) and Banerjee, (1981)]. Thus migration in developing
countries creates spatially separated but economically interdependent extended family units.4
Therefore, in light of empirical evidence from various developing countries which
identifies the family as the relevant decision making unit, it is imperative to revisit policy
analysis which in the past has been primarily conducted employing the standard Harris-
Todaro type individual decision based migration models. Hence in this paper we would
look at the effect of rural and urban subsidy on migration, unemployment and welfare
employing an extended family model of migration. This particular approach integrates both
migration and remittance behaviour under one framework of analysis. However before the
model is outlined we will summarize the most relevant theoretical literature on migration
and policy so as to establish a point of comparison with the results obtained in this paper
using the extended family model. The variation of our results from the received wisdom
will allow us to underscore the importance of using an extended-family framework instead
of the usual Harris-Todaro type approach when conducting policy and welfare analysis.
2. Migration, Policy and Welfare: A Brief Survey of Literature
Harris and Todaro (1970) in their seminal paper specified a simple model of rural to
urban migration in the context of a fixed minimum wage policy, which was the source of
equilibrium urban unemployment. After highlighting this welfare reducing distortionary
effect of the minimum wage policy in the presence of migration, the authors subsequently
dealt with the issue of specifying suitable government policies aimed at eradicating this
distortion and improving social welfare.
The first policy analyzed by the authors was an urban employment subsidy given by
the government to the firms to employ more workers.5 According to them such a subsidy
by creating an additional job could have the adverse effect of exacerbating urban
unemployment levels by potentially attracting more than one migrant for that job. Though
the authors went on to show that a large enough urban employment subsidy could eradicate
urban unemployment, they clearly pointed out that such a subsidy on its own would not
be a `first best'6 policy as in equilibrium, the marginal product in the urban sector would
be lower than that of the rural which would be equal to the urban minimum wage.7
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4In most of the anthropology literature this is termed as the `expanded family' [see, Bartle (1980) and
Kaufman and Lindauer (1980)].
5 The authors assume that the subsidy is financed through some form of non-distortionary lump sum
taxation.
6 A 'first best' equilibrium in terms of labour allocation is when the marginal products in both sectors are
equal and there is no unemployment in the urban or the rural sector.
7 A `first best' policy is a policy which would lead to no urban unemployment and equality of marginal
  products in both sectors i.e., the general equilibrium optimum or the Pareto optimum.To achieve the desired Pareto optimum equilibrium, the authors suggested a policy
combination, i.e., an urban employment subsidy accompanied by migration restrictions,
which would enforce a distribution of population such that there is an equality of marginal
products in both sectors. Thus the rural labourers who cannot find an urban job would be
coerced back to the rural area. The most obvious problem with this policy proposal was
the enforcement of migration restriction in rural areas, a policy which would not only be
politically unpalatable, but, would be contrary to the aim of improving social welfare in a
broader sense.
Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1974) put forward an elegant alternative to the Harris Todaro
policy prescription, which has since become the standard first best policy solution. According
to them a uniform subsidy financed through lump sum taxes extended simultaneously to
both the urban and the rural sector would achieve the first best equilibrium outcome. Simply
put, instead of imposing migration restrictions on rural labour an equal amount of subsidy
disbursed simultaneously to the rural sector would by increasing the income of the rural
labour, automatically reducing their incentive to migrate.
Bhagwati and Srinavasan also analyzed second best subsidies uniquely disbursed to
both the sectors. They showed that a second best wage or employment subsidy in the urban
sector need not be characterized by full employment. Also, similar to the Harris Todaro
result they indicated that a wage subsidy can achieve full employment in the urban sector
though it might be inferior welfare wise to laissez-faire - no subsidy provision. Furthermore,
the second best rural production subsidy was shown to achieve full employment in the
urban sector by reducing the wage differential to zero and hence attracting all the unemployed
labour from the urban sector back to the rural without affecting the urban output level.
Basu (1980, 1997) indicated a practical caveat in the uniform subsidy result so elegantly
expounded by Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1974). According to him the authors implicitly
presumed that a government or social planner computing the optimal subsidy to both the
sectors would know the values of the marginal products in both sectors at the first best. 
He stressed that ex-ante the first best values are not observed and hence because of this
informational problem it would be impossible for a government to implement this policy
as the optimal subsidy, s* would be unknown. However, he proceeded to show that this
informational problem is not insurmountable.
The main contribution of his paper is the proof that any subsidy greater than the optimum
would result in the first best outcome with welfare remaining at its maximum, also, welfare
would monotonically increase with the subsidy for all   . The difference being that
subsidies greater than   would result in the wage in the urban sector to rise above the
minimum,  , a possibility not explicitly considered in the Harris-Todaro (1970) and
Bhagwati Srinavasan (1974) analysis. Hence according to Basu the government could
guarantee the first best outcome by choosing a subsidy in the interval, [ ],  such as
. The central problem which he himself enumerated is the financing issue of such
a large subsidy extended to both sectors. According to him the ability of a government to
internally finance such large parcels of subsidy from lump-sum non-distortionary taxes
would be limited as the subsidy bill might well be in excess of the economies national
income.
Corden and Findlay (1976) extended this standard policy analysis by relaxing the
assumption of specific and hence immobile capital in the two sectors. According to the
authors in the presence of capital mobility, a wage subsidy in the urban sector by increasing
the labour to capital ratio would increase the marginal product of capital in the urban sector.
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of capital in the two sectors are equalized. The fall in agricultural capital and the resultant
increase in its marginal product would be accompanied with a decrease in the marginal
product of labour and wages in the rural sector. The capital flight led fall in the rural wage
would further widen the rural-urban wage gap increasing migration and exacerbating the
unemployment ratio in the urban sector. Thus, according to the authors the mobility of
capital though increases the manufacturing output, results in the increase of the unemployment
ratio also, which otherwise, under specific capital, would have gone down.
Similarly, the authors also looked at the impact of an agricultural wage subsidy in the
presence of capital mobility. With immobile capital a wage subsidy in agriculture was
shown to result in a certain gain by reducing the wage gap and attracting all the unemployed
labour with zero marginal cost (no effect on urban output) back to the rural sector. With
capital mobility, they indicated that the resultant increase in the labour-capital ratio in the
rural sector would increase the marginal product of capital in the rural sector which would
attract capital from the manufacturing sector. This capital inflow would reinforce the
expansion of output in the agricultural sector but this would be at the cost of a fall in the
level of output in the urban sector, though, the net gain in terms of output would still be
positive. Therefore, Corden and Findlay concluded that a rural subsidy would always be
preferred over an urban employment subsidy, however, they pointed out that when it comes
to achieving the first best outcome, uniform subsidies would have to be extended to both
the sectors.
Following on the above standard optimal policy analysis, Shukla and Stark (1990)
modified the Harris-Todaro environment by including an external economies of scale effect
in the urban sector. They analyzed optimal policy given this additional effect keeping all
the other assumptions of the H-T migration framework unaltered. The condition obtained
in their framework for welfare maximization equates the marginal product of labour in the
urban sector taking into account the economies of scale externality with the marginal product
of the rural sector. Hence the subsidies required to achieve the first best optimum are
unequal, that is, the urban subsidy because of the external scale economies, exceeds the
optimal rural subsidy by the marginal effect of the externality on urban output. They showed
that in the absence of such scale economies the standard Bhagwati-Srinavasan (1974) result
of uniform subsidies applies to support the first best optimum.
Gupta (1993) in his paper analysed effects of policy on urban unemployment and social
welfare in a general equilibrium framework with an urban informal sector. The key feature
of the model driving most of the results was that the availability of food in the urban sector
determined the size of the urban labour force. Some of his results ran counter to those
generated by the standard Harris-Todaro migration model. For example an increase in rural
subsidy in his framework led to an increase in urban unemployment. This was essentially
due to the higher food production in the rural sector which resulted in an increase in food
availability and hence food consumption in the urban sector stimulating more migration
thus expanding the urban labour force and worsening unemployment. Also, an urban
employment subsidy by increasing labour demand resulted in a reduction in urban
unemployment as it did not affect food production and hence the supply of labour. In the
welfare analysis Gupta employed Sen’s (1974) social welfare function which incorporated
income inequality through a Gini-coefficient. His results showed that an increase in the
price subsidy to the informal sector improves welfare while an additional capital subsidy
extended to it decreases welfare.
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implications of family decision based migration models on policy and welfare. According
to them individual or family migration decisions would always lead to a migration rate
more than the socially optimal one. This they believe underpins the need for government
intervention in the form of subsidies to check the high migration rates and hence increase
social welfare. The intuition behind their argument is that the migrant individual or family
when deciding on the optimal rate of migration does not take into consideration the negative
effect of the increase in migration on the employment probability in the urban sector.
Accordingly, any migration to them is socially inefficient as it inflicts a higher unemployment
probability on the urban population, therefore, in the H-T class of models the socially
optimal migration rate is zero.
In addition to this the authors incorporated the effect of negative externalities from
migration into the analysis. These externalities are in the form of urban congestion, pollution
in shanty towns etc. In order to include the current and over time impact of these externalities
an intertemporal welfare function was defined. This welfare function consisted of a
component of static externalities per period and also a term for dynamic externality. These
terms were a function of the rate of migration and were subtracted from the total output
of the economy. The authors concluded that the socially optimal migration rate obtained
under such a framework would be lower than in the case without any negative externalities.
In a more recent paper by Fields (2001) the standard policy prescriptions in the Harris
Todaro model were tested for their effect on income inequality and welfare. The latter was
defined as an abbreviated measure of labour market conditions such as labour earnings,
unemployment, inequality of labour income and poverty rates. The three policies considered
are urban job creation termed as modern sector enlargement, rural development referred
to as traditional sector enrichment and modern sector wage restraint. The level of inequality
was measured by a Lorenz curve derived using the three population groups, i.e., urban
employed labour, the unemployed in the urban sector and finally the rural labour. The
results showed that a policy of modern sector enlargement increased income inequality as
it unambiguously increased unemployment while traditional sector enrichment reduced it
by attracting the unemployed back to a positive wage in the rural sector at zero opportunity
cost. The third policy of modern sector wage restraint only reduced inequality if the labour
demand in the sector was sufficiently inelastic.
Finally, Fields analyses of the three policies using the abbreviated welfare function
yielded ambiguous results on all except the policy of traditional sector enrichment, which
was found to unambiguously improve welfare in terms of all the components of the welfare
function. An alternative approach to analyzing welfare adopted by the author was the use
of First Order Dominance, which compares the income of a particular group/person in two
states of income distribution existing prior to a policy and after the policy implementation.
Again the authors found that it is only the policy of traditional sector enrichment or rural
development, which unambiguously increases welfare, the other policies result in ambiguous
outcomes.
In the following section we develop the extended family framework of migration.
3.  An Extended Family Model of Migration
As mentioned before, there is strong empirical evidence on rural to urban migration in
developing countries which suggests that migration leads to the formation of geographically
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therefore implicitly we are assuming that the migrant, are homogenous in terms of skills.
separated but economically linked extended family units [see Caces et al. (1985) and
Banerjee (1984, 1991)]. The established migrant household in the urban area not only
provides shelter to the new migrants but also economic support to the origin or rural
household in the form of remittances, thus, in a way, complementing or taking on the role
of community level networks. Therefore in this particular paper we try to construct an
analytical framework of migration where the decision-making unit is not the individual but
the extended family.
The extended family in our model comprises of two households the urban migrant and
the rural origin household. Thus the migrant after leaving the countryside joins friends or
relatives in the urban migrant household which then acts as a support to the migrant in the
instance of unemployment as we assume income sharing within the households. The link
between these two households is maintained through remittances flowing from the migrants
to their rural counterparts. Hence, remittance is an integral part of the extended family
framework developed in the paper. Moreover, throughout the analysis we assume that
individuals and the family at large is altruistic and therefore the decision of migration as
well as remittance is based on maximizing the welfare of the entire extended family. We
believe that in light of the empirical literature this extended family based approach in
modeling migration is more comprehensive and hence closer to reality in analyzing migration
issues in the context of developing countries than the standard method of focusing on
individual decision making processes [see Stark (1985, 1991) and Banerjee (1981, 1991)].
The similarity with the Harris Todaro analysis comes from the modelling of the urban
sector which for simplicity has been assumed to comprise of just one formal sector in which
the firms pay a fixed minimum wage to its employees hence resulting in a fixed demand
for labour and equilibrium unemployment, another persistent feature in cities in the developing
world. In the model we assume that labour in the urban sector consists of just the migrants
while the urban born are the owners of capital. Thus, in equilibrium we can determine the
number of migrants, the fraction of remittance, the employment probability and subsequently
the output levels in both the sectors. The Harris-Todaro type migration decision and its
impact on migration levels in the urban sector appears as a special case of our framework.
Within this extended family framework we first analyze the impact of standard government
policy prescriptions such as urban employment subsidy and a rural income subsidy on
migration and urban unemployment. Secondly we look at the impact of a subsidy transfer
from urban to the rural sector on social welfare. Throughout the analysis we assume that
the subsidies are financed through some form of foreign aid.
3.1The Model
There are two sectors urban   and rural   in the economy. The urban competitive
sector produces   units of output using both labour and a fixed capital endowment. The
labour in the urban sector is assumed to comprise of migrants only. The number of migrants,
, from the rural sector are endogenously determined and are assumed to inhabit the same
household in the urban sector which we would refer to as the migrant household. Therefore
the total supply of labour in the urban sector is given by8
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The fixed capital,  , in the urban sector is assumed to be owned exclusively by the
endowment of urban born native population,  , all of whom comprise the urban born
capitalist household. Assuming constant returns to scale the production function in the
urban sector is therefore:
(2)
where,  , is the employed migrant labour force.
Now looking at the rural sector, for conceptual simplicity we assume that it consists of
a single household, where the total supply of labour is equal to the total endowment of
labour in that sector,  , minus the number of new migrants,  , that is:
  (3)
The household uses its labour, the only factor of production, to produce an output,  ,
given by the following constant returns to scale production function:
(4)
We assume a small open economy where the product prices are exogenous and without
loss of generality assumed to be equal to one. Given exogenous product prices the firms
in the urban sector are assumed to be perfectly competitive and therefore their profit
maximizing conditions is
(5)
where,  , is the institutionally fixed urban minimum wage received by each employed
migrant in the urban sector.9
From (5) we can determine the firms demand for migrant labour,  . Now as mentioned
before,  , constitutes the migrants, therefore
(6)
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9 We maintain the standard Harris-Todaro assumption that the urban minimum wage,  , is greater than
the constant rural marginal product,  , that is,  . Also as labour markets in developing
countries are highly segmented, minimum wage regulation is only applicable to a generally very small
formal sector while the bulk of employment is in the unregulated informal sector. In this model one can
think of the unemployed migrants as being part of the large informal sector where they eke out a living.
Hence, for simplicity, we assume here that these unemployed migrants earn a zero wage but survive
through income sharing within their households.As is clear from above we assume that there is unemployment amongst the migrant
labour as a consequence of the fixed urban minimum wage. The employment rate,  ,
amongst the migrants is therefore
(7)
where
The above employment rate is also taken as the probability of employment for the
migrants. Now using (7) the income per capita of the members of the urban migrant
household,  , and the rural household,  , is therefore
(8)
(9)
where,  , is the fraction of income the migrant household remits to the rural, and,  , is the
direct cost of migration of a family member which is borne by the rural household, hence
 is the total cost of migration. The per capita utility levels of the members of the migrant
household and the rural household are given by their indirect utility functions:10
(10)
where the indirect utility functions satisfy positive and diminishing marginal utilities
(11)
In this model, the migrant household in the urban sector is assumed to be the extension
of the rural household, hence both the households make up one extended family unit. The
decision to migrate in this framework is made at the family level, and we assume that the
family size is large, so that, appealing to the Strong Law of Large Numbers, we can assume
away the existence of aggregate uncertainty for the family, although new migrants face the
probability of not getting a job in the urban sector and individually each member of both
households is risk averse.11 The extended family therefore decides the optimal number of
migrants,  , to send to the urban sector by maximizing the following utilitarian family
welfare function which is the sum of the utilities of the members of both the migrant and
rural household:12
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10Here we are assuming that members of one household have the same preferences hence implicitly we
are making the assumption that migrants instantaneously change their preferences upon arrival in the city.
11For a similar assumption in the context of international migration see Lahiri and Fregoso (2000).
12Since we assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty, we do not need to consider expected utility. If
we did not make this assumption we would have to consider risk premium which would entail possibly
different comparative static results than the ones derived in this paper.(12)
Differentiating the above welfare function with respect to using (8), (9) and (10) and
taking the probability,   of getting a job as given we get the following first order condition,
assuming that the solutions are in the interior:13
(13)
The above migration equilibrium condition can be rewritten as
(14)
where
In the above,  , is the net marginal cost of migration per member of the rural household
including both the direct and indirect costs of migration. Where,  , is the direct cost of
migration and,  , is the surplus or deficit which the marginal migrant produces for
each member in the rural household, and,  , is what a marginal migrant remits to the
rural household and is therefore a negative cost (benefit) of migration. Hence in equilibrium
the utility differential for the migrants,  , or the marginal benefit of migration is equal
to the marginal costs of migration given that these costs are shared equally between the
family members of the rural household.
It has to be noted that the marginal cost to the rural household can be either positive
or negative, but, in the presence of high direct costs of migration and low levels of initial
income in rural areas, it is likely to be positive. Though, there exists a theoretical possibility
in our model that if these costs are negative i.e., there are net benefits accruing to the rural
household from the departure of a member we would have a migration equilibrium, see
(14), with the utility of the migrants less than those of their rural counterparts.14 Hence, we
could have a scenario in which the family sends a migrant even when the per-capita utility
of the rural household members is greater than that of the migrant, that is, the migrant is
worse off than his or her rural family members. This interesting possibility in our model
arises due to the fact that migration decisions are made at the level of the family and not
the individual. However we shall assume here that the net marginal costs of migration to
the rural household are positive,  , so that  .This condition simply ensures
that there are gains from migration.
S.M Turab Hussain/ CMER Working Paper No. 05-37
11
13Second Order Condition:
14 4.  Policy Analysis
Similar to the standard Harris-Todaro framework, in our model the equilibrium sectoral
labour distribution is inefficient compared to the first best defined by equality of marginal
products in both sectors and no equilibrium unemployment. The source of  inefficiency in
both the H-T class of models and our framework is the minimum wage distortion in the
urban sector which results in the equilibrium unemployment in the sector. Now given this
inefficiency, the policy option suggested by Harris and Todaro (1970) was the creation of
more urban jobs, so as to increase the urban employment and hence urban output accompanied
by a migration restriction, which would hold migration at the social optimal, hence increasing
the rural output also. Subsequent contributions by Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1974), Corden
and Findlay (1975) and Basu (1980) suggested a more viable policy alternative in the form
of a uniform wage subsidy extended simultaneously to both the urban and the rural sector.
This uniform subsidy was shown to achieve the first best outcome, as defined above, if it
was financed by some form of non-distortionary taxes.
The objective of this particular section is to examine the effectiveness of these standard
government subsidy policies i.e., an urban employment subsidy and a rural income subsidy,
in rectifying the equilibrium inefficiency, characterized by the equilibrium urban
unemployment under the extended family setup. Therefore we analyze here the comparative
static effects of these two standard government policy instruments on equilibrium migration
and unemployment levels in the urban sector. Throughout this comparative static analysis
we assume that these government subsidies are financed through some form of foreign aid.
The results of these exercises are evaluated in light of those obtained in the standard H-T
literature on migration.
4.1. Employment Subsidy in the Urban Sector
In order to examine the impact of an employment subsidy on equilibrium migration and
unemployment levels we would first specify the function for the employment rate in the
urban sector and the migrant supply function incorporating this subsidy. As is intuitively
obvious the employment subsidy by creating more jobs in the urban sector would increase
the urban employment probability which would subsequently effect the supply of migrants
from the rural sector. We would first conduct the exercise under the assumption of exogenous
remittances thus for simplicity and without loss of any generality throughout this section
we shall assume the remittance fraction to be equal to zero.
4.2 The Case of Exogenous Remittances
Urban Employment Subsidy and The Urban Employment Rate:
The employment rate is derived from the first order condition of profit maximization
of firms. Now with an employment subsidy of, , per labour given to the firms in the urban
sector, so that more labour is employed at the fixed urban minimum wage, the first order
profit maximizing condition of firms is:
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Totally differentiating the above condition we get
(16)
Now as the employment rate in the urban sector is,  , we have
(17)
Substituting the above equation into (16) and solving we get
(18)
where
The above partial with respect to the employment subsidy shows that an incremental
increase in the subsidy by creating an additional job would increase the urban employment
rate, i.e., shift the employment rate function to the right. Also this function is downward
sloping with respect to the number of new migrants as an increase in their numbers has to
be accompanied by a fall in the employment rate so as to keep the number of employed
constant due to the fixed urban minimum wage.
The Employment Subsidy, Migrant Supply and Induced Migration:





As the employment subsidy in the urban sector has no direct effect on migrant supply,
the only effect is the indirect effect which comes through a change in employment probability,
therefore given exogenous remittances we would write, (19), as a function:
(21)
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function:
(22)
where,   and with 
(23)
therefore
The above partial simply shows that an increase in the employment probability raises
the expected income of the migrant labour in the urban sector hence resulting in more
migration. Therefore we can clearly see that an increase in the urban employment subsidy
by creating more jobs would attract more migrants from the rural sector. Thus solving the
migrant supply, (22) and employment rate function, (18), simultaneously we get:
(24)
where the denominator, 
15
 and from (18) and (20), we get the following comparative
static results:
and from (18)
Proposition 1: With exogenous remittances an increase in employment subsidy in the
urban sector would unambiguously increase equilibrium number of migrants and the
employment rate in that sector.
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15 The above result, more commonly known as the case of `induced migration', is fairly
intuitive and in line with the standard Harris Todaro type literature on policy and migration,
[see Harris and Todaro (1970), Corden and Findlay (1975) and Fields (2001)]. An employment
subsidy in the urban sector increases the demand for labour by firms, thus, the creation of
more jobs increases the employment probability for migrants. This in turn induces the
extended family to send more migrants to the urban sector.
The Urban Employment Subsidy and Equilibrium Unemployment:
Now we would look at the effect of this policy on equilibrium unemployment levels
in the urban sector, though, the above results shows that the equilibrium employment rate
in the sector would always increase as a consequence of the subsidy. The initial equilibrium
unemployment level,     in the urban sector is
(25)




Now from (15), we have the increase in labour demand,   and we




The denominator in (29) is positive while the numerator is ambiguous:
(30)
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direct costs of migration were sufficiently large, resulting in   see (20). Hence we
can state the following conditional result as:
Proposition 2: In the absence of any remittances from the migrant household, an increase
in employment subsidy might reduce (increase) urban unemployment if the direct costs of
migration are sufficiently high (low).
Figure 1
Employment Subsidy and Induced Migration: Low and High Costs of Migration







































Graphically, higher costs of migration,    entails an inelastic migrant supply
function, see Fig. 1. Hence, if the direct costs of migration facing the rural household are
large enough, then the resulting increase in employment probability, due to the incremental
rise in the subsidy, would have a smaller effect on the increase in the number of new
migrants to the urban sector (smaller elasticity of migration), creating the possibility of an
actual decline in the unemployment level.
On the other hand, an increase in employment probability would have a more magnified
impact on the level of migration (a high elasticity of migration) and hence, exacerbate urban
unemployment if the non-negative marginal costs of migration are sufficiently low. In this
instance the increased supply of migrants would exceed the rise in the rate of absorption
of migrants into the labor force (higher labour demand) which comes as a consequence of
the employment subsidy. Hence the net effect would be an enlargement of the unemployment
pool in the urban sector.Thus, under this extended family framework of migration, an employment subsidy given
to the firms in the urban sector has the potential of exacerbating the problem of unemployment
rather than ameliorating it specifically in situations where the rural households do not face
high direct costs of migration. This result, as mentioned before, within this extended family
migration framework is fairly consistent with those from the individual migration decision
based literature dealing with policy implications on migration and unemployment. More
specifically in their seminal paper Harris and Todaro (1970) explicitly show that if the
elasticity of migration is greater than unity then in that instance, urban job creation would
unambiguously increase the size of the urban unemployment pool.
21
Now we would look at the case of endogenous remittances to see whether the results
derived in this section change qualitatively or not.
4.3. The Case of Endogenous Remittances
The Employment Subsidy, Remittance Augmented Migrant Supply and Induced Migration:
In this sub section, we will look at whether there are any qualitative differences in the
results if the remittance fraction is endogenised. This analysis is conducted under the
assumption that the preferences of the extended family members are identical or homogenous
22.
The results under the assumption of heterogenous preferences are not qualitatively different
from the analysis with exogenous remmittances hence, for the purpose of brevity, these
have been excluded here. Now the extended family simultaneously decides on the optimal
number of migrants to send to the urban area and also the optimal amount of remittance
to send to the rural household. Therefore, maximizing the welfare function with respect to
M (as before) and, assuming that the solutions are in the interior, we get the following




While (31) is the migration equilibrium condition, (32), gives the optimal remittance
condition.
24 The latter states that the urban migrant household would remit a fraction,  ,
of its income till the marginal utilities of both the households are equalized.
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21See, Harris and Todaro (1970), Appendix II, P. 139.
22The results under the assumption of heterogenous preferences are not qualitatively different from the
analysis with exogenous remmittances hence for the purpose of brevity these have been excluded here.
23Second Order Condition (remittances):
24As done in the last chapter we assume here that there are gains from migration,   therefore  .Homogenous Preferences: When the preferences of both the household members are
identical, than looking at the optimal remittance condition which states that in equilibrium
the marginal utility of income of both the households should be the same, (32), it is clear
that with homogenous preferences this implies that the migrant household would remit to
the rural household till the income per capita of both the households are the same, i.e.,
. Therefore substituting (32) into (31) and putting      into the migration
equilibrium we see that the net marginal costs of migration would go to zero, yielding the
following simplified migration equilibrium we see that the net marginal costs of migration
would go to zero, yielding the following simplified migration equilibrium condition:
(33)
The above condition is similar to the Harris-Todaro type migration equilibrium condition
indicating that the extended family would keep on sending new migrants till the expected
wage in the urban sector is equal to the marginal product in the rural sector plus the direct
costs of migration. Hence, as the urban wage is fixed and so is the rural marginal product,
migration equilibrium in this case is brought about by the change in the employment
probability and therefore expected wages in the urban sector. The similarity with the Harris-
Todaro condition comes from the fact that in this model with endogenous remittances and
homogenous preferences the extended family becomes one large identical group with the
same income per capita and preferences, which correspond to the rural household or labor
force in the H-T model thus giving the same first order conditions.
25 In the H-T model no
distinction is made between migrant and non-migrant groups and hence in their equilibrium
the population proportion in both sectors as well as equilibrium unemployment is determined
and not the number of employed and unemployed migrants explicitly.
Now with this modified first order condition we can analyze the comparative static
results of an incremental increase in employment subsidy. We can explicitly solve for
equilibrium migrants by substituting the equation for employment probability into the
migration condition, giving us:
(34)
    From the above we get:
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25It is worthwhile to note that in their seminal paper, as Harris and Todaro (1970) did not distinguish between
the urban born labour and the migrant labour, they assume that "the typical migrant retains his ties to
the rural sector and, therefore, the income that he earns as an urban worker will be considered, from
the standpoint of sectoral welfare, as accruing to the rural sector" [Harris and Todaro (1970), page 127)].
The authors justify this assumption by highlighting the observed phenomenon of migration leading to
the emergence of extended family systems with remittances flowing between the migrant and the origin.and from (33)
Proposition 3 With endogenous remittances and homogenous preferences of the  exte-
nded family members, an employment subsidy in the urban sector would unambiguously
increase the equilibrium number of migrants in the urban sector while the employment rate
would remain unchanged.
Figure 2
Employment Subsidy and Induced Migration
With   and Homogenous Preferences
Graphically, see Fig. 2, the effect of the subsidy in this case can be shown as a rightward
shift in the function for the employment rate and with a perfectly elastic migrant supply
we would have an increase in equilibrium migration with the employment rate unchanged.
In this case the employment subsidy increases labour demand as before and initially the
employment probability goes up substantially attracting a large number of migrants from
the rural sector. This increase in the number of migrants is to such an extent that the
employment rate finally goes down to its original initial equilibrium level. Thus, the overall
effect on the level of migration in this particular case would be unambiguously greater than
under exogenous remittances.
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Now we can determine the effect of the subsidy on the level of unemployment in the
urban sector under this assumption of homogenous preferences. The change in unemployment
level in the urban sector is:
Now from (15) we have the increase in labour demand,   and we
know,  . Therefore we get the following expression:
Proposition 4 With homogenous preferences an increase in employment subsidy would
unambiguously increase the level of unemployment in the urban sector*
The intuition of the above result is simply that the creation of one additional job in the
urban sector through the employment subsidy attracts more than one additional migrant
from the rural sector, that is,   resulting in the unambiguous expansion in the
urban unemployment pool, (see Fig. 3 where ￿ M > ￿ L and hence  ). This result
is identical to that in the Harris-Todaro model with the assumption of a constant marginal
product in the rural sector.
26
Therefore, we have shown that with endogenous remittance there is a substantial
difference in the results if we assume homogenous preferences of the extended family
members. In this particular case, as the direct and indirect costs of migration are driven to
zero, the effect of the employment subsidy on migration levels is always larger than when
remittances are assumed to be exogenous in the framework. Furthermore, this large increase
in the level of migration on account of the employment subsidy leads to an unambiguous
expansion in the urban unemployment pool.
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26In drawing the rectangular hyperbola in Fig. 3 we simply assume that the direct cost of migration C is
equal to zero.Figure 3
Enlargement of the Unemployment Pool
The Case of Endogenous and Homogenous Preferences
Summary of Results:
The following table summarizes the comparative static results obtained in this section:
Table 1
Effect of Urban Employment Subsidy
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In the following section we will analyze the impact of an income subsidy to the rural
sector on equilibrium rural to urban migration and urban unemployment.
4.4Income Subsidy in the Rural Sector
A policy which, has shown to be successful in both curbing migration and improving
welfare in the H-T class of models, is a rural income or employment subsidy. Such a
subsidy, by reducing the income gap between the urban and rural sector, is shown to lessen
the incentive for migration and hence attract the unemployed migrant labour back to the
rural sector thus increasing rural output and reducing urban unemployment. Here, we analyze
the impact of such a policy in the extended family framework of migration. Therefore asubsidy of,   per capita is given to the members of the rural household who do not migrate
i.e., the rural ‘stayers’, in order to create an incentive for the family to lower the number
of migrants it sends to the urban sector. The income per capita of the rural household with
the subsidy is now:
(35)
while the income per capita of the migrant household is the same
(36)
With the above income per capita the migration equilibrium condition is now:
(37)
where
The additional term in the above marginal cost of migration is  , which is the loss of the
incremental subsidy to the rural household as a result of the departure of a family member
to the urban sector. Here again we maintain the assumption   that so that migration
is beneficial for the migrant, 
4.5 The Case of Exogenous Remittances
Migrant Supply and the Income Subsidy to the Rural Stayers:
Now as the rural subsidy effects the supply of migrants we would have to derive the
migrant supply function again. Writing the above migration equilibrium as a function
assuming remittances to be exogenous and equal to zero:
(38)
Totally differentiating the above function we get
(39)
Solving for    :
(40)
where
The function for the employment rate is unaffected and hence is:
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Now we can now solve (40) and (41) simultaneously to get the comparative static results:
(42)
  
Now in the above,   and in the numerator we have
(43)
and given that   we get
Therefore we can state the following conditional result and proposition:
where   is the ratio of absolute risk aversion.
Now as,   the above sufficient condition becomes:
Proposition 5 With exogenous remittances the rural subsidy would lower equilibrium
migration and increase the urban employment rate if the direct costs of migration are
sufficiently small.
The above results are conditional because the increase in the income subsidy has two
effects, which run counter to each other. The first effect (see first term in)is the increase
in the income per-capita or the utility per capita of the rural household on account of the
increase in subsidy, which by reducing the utility differential between the urban/migrant
and rural household lessens the incentive for migration. This can be termed as a dampening
of the 'pull' factor of migration. The second effect (second term in  ) comes also from the
increase in per capita income of the rural household which by reducing the marginal utility
of income, in the presence of positive marginal costs of migration,  , reduces these
costs in terms of utility thus stimulating more migration. The latter positive effect can be
termed as an increase in the 'push' factor of migration.
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relative strength of these two effects and also on the shape of the preferences of the rural
stayers. Hence, the effect would be negative if either direct costs of marginal migration
were sufficiently low or the risk aversion ratio of the rural stayers was small.
27 The interesting
aspect of this result is that it is markedly different from that in the Harris-Todaro type
individual migration decision models where a rural subsidy always decreases migration by
reducing the rural urban wage or income gap. In our framework the modelling of migration
in terms of a family welfare maximization problem results in this apparent ambiguity in
the predicted effect of a rural subsidy.
This particular result underlines the significance of the economic characteristics of the
rural household in the eventual effectiveness of government income subsidy policies directed
towards rural areas. In the case where such subsidies are provided to relatively poor rural
households, the additional income supplement reduces the households migration cost
constraint and therefore instead of reducing their incentive to send more migrants actually
helps them to finance more migration. In literature on both internal and international
migration it has been shown that a higher income at home or the origin can boost migration.
See, for example, Banerjee and Kanbur (1981) in the context of rural-urban migration,
Lopez and Schiff (1998) and Lahiri and Fregoso (2000) for the case of international
migration. In the first two, increased income makes it easier for the potential migrant to
borrow to finance the costs of migration while in the third, similar to our result, the authors
show that higher aid income facilitates migration by lowering the costs of migration in
terms of utility.
The Rural Income Subsidy and Equilibrium Unemployment:
The effect of the income subsidy on the unemployment level is trivial as it just follows
from the above result. We know that the change in unemployment is given by:
(44)
Now as the rural subsidy has no impact on equilibrium employment level in the urban
sector, that is,   therefore the level of unemployment in the urban sector would
fall if the equilibrium migration level falls. Hence,
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27A low risk aversion ratio translates into a utility function with a flatter curvature. Therefore when the
income of the rural household goes up on account of the subsidy the resulting change (decrease) in the
marginal utility of income would be relatively small and hence the fall in the marginal costs of migration
in terms of utility would be of a lower magnitude i.e., a dampening of the 'push' factor of migration.Proposition 6 The level of unemployment in the urban sector would fall on account of
the increase in rural subsidy if the direct costs of migration are sufficiently low.
Now we would look at the case of endogenous remittances.
4.6 The Case of Endogenous Remittances
Remittance Augmented Migrant Supply and the Income Subsidy to the Rural Stayers:
Now the extended family simultaneously decides on the optimal number of migrants
to send to the urban area and also the optimal amount of remittance to send to the rural
household. Therefore maximizing the welfare function with respect to    and    (as before),




Writing the migration and remittance equilibrium conditions as functions:
(47)
(48)
Totally differentiating the above two functions and carrying out appropriate substitutions
we get the following implicit migrant supply function:
28
(49)
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28Here, , can be written altematively as:
In the above we can see the additional effect from endogensing remittances separately.Solving the above and the migrant demand function simultaneously we get
(50)
where,     







Using the above partials the entire terms,  , simplifies to
(55)
and from the above expression we can derive the following conditional result:
The above condition is similar to the one obtained for the case of exogenous remittances,
in fact the exogenous remittance condition would be sufficient to satisfy the above result.
Hence we can state the following proposition:
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29Proposition 7 If the marginal costs of migration are sufficiently low, than in this instance,
an increase in the rural income subsidy would reduce equilibrium migration and increase
the employment rate in the urban sector given endogenously determined remittances.
With endogenous remittance the additional effect which comes through remittances is
negative,  , as an increase in the subsidy, by lowering the marginal
utility of income for the rural household, would decrease marginal remittance from the
migrants,   , see (52). This decrease in remittance would in turn have a negative
effect on the number of migrants as,  . This is because a decrease in marginal
remittances by lowering the per-capita income of the rural household would increase the
costs of migration in terms of utility hence reducing the number of migrants, see (51).
Therefore the condition, in terms of the size of the positive marginal costs of migration,
for the total effect to be negative is less stringent than in the case of exogenous remittances.
Now similar to last section, we would look at the case of homogenous preferences.
Homogenous Preferences With homogenous preference the migration equilibrium
condition, (37), would reduce to the following simple H-T type condition,
(56)
which can be written as:
(57)
The above equilibrium condition states that the rural household would keep on sending
migrants till the expected urban wage net of direct costs of migration is equal to the marginal
product of labour in the rural sector plus the income subsidy per member of the rural
household.
From (57), using the equation for the employment probability,  we obtain the
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Now we would look at the effect of the subsidy on unemployment level in the urban
sector given the assumption of homogenous preferences:
(61)
As explained in the previous section the rural subsidy has no effect on equilibrium fixed
employment level in the urban sector therefore,   Hence the change in
unemployment is just determined by the effect of the subsidy on equilibrium migration,
which in this case is unambiguously negative,   Hence
(62)
With endogenous remittances and homogenous preferences of the extended family
members, the indirect costs of migration,   are driven to zero, and, the income per capita
of both the urban migrant and rural household are equalized giving us the migration
equilibrium (57). Therefore the increase in income subsidy by simply reducing the gap
between rural and urban income would lessen the incentive of migration directly and
unambiguously, see Fig. 4.
Figure 4
Rural Income Subsidy and Migration: With     and Homogenous Preferences
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family members an income subsidy to the rural sector would unambiguously decrease the
equilibrium level of new migrants, increase employment probability in the urban sector
and would also decrease the unemployment level in the sector.
Therefore the assumption of homogenous preferences of the members of the family
leads to a qualitative difference in the results. The rural subsidy in this case is very effective
in reducing the level of migration to the urban sector and therefore also ameliorating the
urban unemployment problem, see the Fig.5.
Figure 5
Rural Subsidy which restores Full Employment in the Urban Sector
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Hence in this scenario it would be preferred to an urban employment subsidy as a policy
tool to reduce the urban unemployment level.
Summary of Results:
The following table summarizes the results obtained in this section:
Table 2
Effect of Rural Income Subsidy5. Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis within the H-T class of models has been generally focused on the
type, size and allocation of subsidy provision aimed at achieving the 'first best' outcome.
In their seminal paper Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1974), showed hat a uniform subsidy
financed through some form of non-distortionary tax extended simultaneously to the rural
and urban sector would result in the first best outcome to be realised. As most of the
developing countries have varied external and internal sources of revenue generation and
a large part of their development budgets for both rural and urban projects are often financed
through bilateral and multilateral foreign aid or development grants our assumption of
foreign aid financed subsidies is in accordance with the observed pattern of budgetary
financing. However the interesting issue which arises with foreign aid financed subsidies
is the optimal usage or allocation of these given that such aid or grant is in most cases fully
fungible. This section, therefore, focuses on the welfare implications of distributing this
limited but fungible foreign aid resource to either the urban or the rural sector. More
specifically, now that we have analyzed the comparative static effects of the two subsidy
policies on both migration and unemployment here we look at the effect on social welfare,
as defined by a Weighted Utilitarian Social Welfare Function (WUSFWF), of a transfer
of the foreign aid financed subsidy resources from the urban to the rural sector.
5.1Welfare Effects of a Transfer of Foreign Aid Financed Subsidy from the Urban to the
Rural Sector.
Weighted Utilitarian Social Welfare Function:
First of all we would specify the Weighted Utilitarian Social Welfare Function, which
is a sum of the indirect per-capita utility of each member of the economy or all the households
in our model, i.e., the urban born, the migrant and the rural:
(63)
where
the above welfare function can be written as
(64)
As mentioned before we have assumed that the urban born population,  are the sole
owners of the capital stock,  , therefore their income is derived from the rental rate of
capital,  , which is obtained from the first order profit maximization condition of firms in
the urban sector:
(65)
S.M Turab Hussain/ CMER Working Paper No. 05-37
30The Foreign Aid Constraint:
Now the following is the relevant Foreign Aid constraint:
(69)
the left hand side of which is the total subsidy expenditure, and the right hand side,   is
the total foreign aid disbursed. Totally differentiating the above constraint and putting,
, we get the following equation specifying an incremental transfer of subsidy from
one sector to another:
(70)
Now substituting the above into equation (68) we get:
(71)
The above equation captures the change in social welfare from the incremental transfer
of subsidy from the urban to the rural sector. The first term in the above is the change in
the per capita utility of the urban born from a incremental fall in the urban employment
subsidy. This is negative as a decrease in the employment subsidy by lowering the urban
employed migrant labour force results in a decline in the rental rate of capital and hence a
fall in the income of the urban born capitalists, that is, using the first order condition of
firms:
(72)
The above positive partial effect on the rental rate is the positive effect on the income
per capita of the urban born capitalists from an increase in migrant labour on account of
the employment subsidy. This effect is similar to that expounded in the literature on migration
surplus which constitutes the gain in the incomes of the capitalists at the destination from
marginal migration. [Borjas (1995)].
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(66)
The income per capita of the migrant and the rural household is the same as before, see
(35) and (36).
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Now writing the above social welfare function as a function of both the employment
subsidy and the rural income subsidy we get the following expression:
(67)
To allow for inter personal comparison of utilities we assume that the preferences of
all the members in the economy are the same in the above social welfare function. Now
totally differentiating the above function and using the migration and remittance equilibrium
condition and also substituting the weights which are chosen by the social planner to be
the inverse of the marginal utility of income of each member:
we get the following reduced expression:
(68)
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30As the direct cost of migration C is exogenous in the framework we simply assume that it is equal to zero.
Otherwise these would translate into a lump sum income transfer to the urban born and would in any case
cancel out from the expression of the total differential of the welfare function.However in this case the marginal decrease in the urban employment subsidy by reducing
the demand for migrant labour lowers the rental income per capita and hence utility of the
urban born capitalists thus representing a deficit to the urban capitalists.
The second and third term in (71) is the net change in the per-capita utility of the
migrants from the subsidy transfer. From the comparative static policy analysis done in the
previous section for the case of endogenous remittances and homogenous preferences of
the extended family, we have:
Therefore, the decrease in the employment subsidy has no effect on equilibrium urban
employment rate and hence on migrant expected income per-capita while the subsequent
increase in the rural subsidy lowers migration unambiguously and increases the employment
rate and expected income per capita of the migrants. Thus the net effect on income and
utility of the migrants from the incremental transfer of resources from the urban to the rural
sector would be positive.
Finally the last term in (71) is the increase in the utility of the rural household members
from the rise in the rural income subsidy. Now substituting the above three results into (71)
and simplifying we get the following overall result:
Proposition 9 A transfer of subsidy from the urban to the rural sector in the case of
homogenous preferences of the extended family unambiguously increases the welfare of
the society.
In the case analyzed above, a rural subsidy unambiguously reduces migration and
increases the employment probability and hence, expected migrant/labour incomes in the
urban sector while also increasing the income per capita of the non-migrants in the rural
sector. On the other hand, an employment subsidy while increasing the number of employed
migrants in the urban sector stimulates more migration resulting in no change in equilibrium
employment probability, hence, keeping the expected income in the urban sector unchanged.
Therefore, a shift of resources or aid from the urban to the rural sector increases the expected
labour/migrant income in the urban sector and also the rural income, these two positive
effects on social welfare outweigh the negative welfare effect of a fall in rental income of
the urban born individuals due to the incremental reduction in the urban employment subsidy
thus resulting in an overall welfare improvement. This result is similar to the one obtained
by Fields (2001) within a Harris-Todaro environment of migration. He ranks the rural
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defined as an abbreviated measure of labour market features such as urban unemployment.
The above result underpins the importance of rural development as opposed to urban biased
policies in improving the economic conditions of developing countries.
6. Conclusion
This paper attempted to formalize some aspects of the complex migration process in
developing countries by incorporating into a theoretical framework the empirically observed
phenomenon of migration leading to the development of spatially separated but economically
linked extended families. Thus, an extended family model was developed which encapsulated
both migration and remittance behaviour. We saw that the analysis of migration and policy
within this methodology generated much richer and varied results than the simple Harris-
Todaro individual decision based model. For the case of the urban employment subsidy it
was found that in both the case of exogenous and endogenous remittances, the increase in
the subsidy by increasing the expected wage in the urban sector attracted more migrants
from the rural sector in equilibrium. Furthermore, with regard to unemployment levels, the
employment subsidy was found to exacerbate the problem, if migration costs were sufficiently
low, encouraging more equilibrium migrants from the rural area. In the case of homogenous
preferences of the members of the extended family, the migration equilibrium reduced to
the familiar H-T type condition where the effect of the subsidy on unemployment level was
found to be unambiguously positive. The broader policy lesson which could be drawn from
the analysis of employment subsidies is that any initiative of the government, which
concentrates on urban sector development, such as provision of housing facilities etc, is
bound to increase the pull factor of migration and worsen existing employment conditions
in the sector. The tough policy choice facing any decision maker would be in terms of
weighing the welfare improvements of the current and potential migrants from such policy
initiatives with the socio-economic costs, which these would entail in terms of greater
unemployment and lower expected incomes spread over the entire urban population.
Although the results on the impact of the employment subsidy on migration under the
extended family framework were fairly intuitive and in line with the H-T type literature
on migration and policy issues, the effect of the rural subsidy on migration was found to
be quite different. It was shown that under the extended family framework of migration the
rural subsidy did not unambiguously decrease migration, as is the case in the individual
decision models of migration. In fact, if the costs of migration were high enough the subsidy
was likely to encourage more migration. The intuition here was that although the subsidy
to the rural household reduces the income gap between the sectors and hence, lowers the
incentive for migration, it also simultaneously encourages migration by lowering the costs
of migration in terms of utility facing the rural stayers.
Thus one would expect that increases in income subsidy to low income rural households,
for whom the direct costs of migration are relatively higher, might initially encourage them
to send more migrants. Therefore, in a way the rural subsidy facilitates the extended family
in financing more migration. Only under the assumption of homogenous preferences and
endogenous remittance, where the migrants remit a fraction of their income to the rural/origin
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unambiguous decrease in equilibrium migration on account of the rural subsidy. These
results highlight the importance of the underlying economic characteristics of rural households
in the eventual success of any policy aimed at reducing migration through targeting the
rural-origin sector. A policy which broadly targets rural households i.e., lump sum transfer
payments, without taking into consideration the prevalent economic diversity such as income
distribution and extent of poverty at the village and household level runs the risk of being
counter productive.
The results obtained in these policy comparative static analyses underscore the importance
of both the economic characteristics of the rural or origin household and the remittance
linkage between the two households in determining the eventual effectiveness of the policies
in terms of curbing migration and reducing the level of urban unemployment. Thus, this
extended family approach allows us to comprehensively analyze the various possible effects
of policy which in an individual decision framework would not be addressed.
In the last section on Welfare Analysis we saw that a shift of foreign aid financed subsidy
resources from the urban to the rural sector unambiguously led to an improvement in social
welfare. This result highlights the importance of rural development to successfully curb
migration, reduce urban unemployment and thus increase social welfare. It also corroborates
the findings by Fields (2001), which show that in the H-T framework a rural subsidy
increases rural output at a zero opportunity cost by attracting the unemployed urban migrant
labour back to the rural sector and hence is superior welfare wise to an employment subsidy
which tends to exacerbate urban unemployment. As these results focused on sectoral welfare
effects of the subsidy transfer these had some limited similarities with the immigration
surplus literature which looks at the effect of immigration on the welfare of the incumbent
or native population. In our case the incremental transfer of subsidy from the urban to the
rural sector by reducing the employed migrant labour force had the opposite effect of
decreasing the rental income and hence welfare of the urban native capitalists.
S.M Turab Hussain/ CMER Working Paper No. 05-37
35REFERENCES
A. R. Kemal, Irfan, M., and Mahmood, N. (2003). Population of Pakistan: An Analysis
of 1998 Population and Housing Census. Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics. Islamabad.
Banerjee, Biswajit (1981). Rural-urban migration and family ties: An analysis of family
considerations in migration behavior in India. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics. 43(4), 321-354.
Banerjee, Biswajit (1984). Information flow, expectations and job search: Rural-to-
urban migration process in India. Journal of Development Economics. 15, 239-257.
Banerjee, Biswajit (1991). The determinants of migrating with a prearranged job and
of the initial duration of urban unemployment. Journal of Development Economics.
36, 337-351.
Bartle, Philips F.W. (1980). Cyclical Migration and the Extended Community: A West
African Example. Paper. Afrika Studiecentrum. Leyden.
Basu, K. C. (1980). Optimal policies in dual economies. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
95(1), 187-95.
Basu, K. C. (1997). Analytical Development Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bhagwati, J. N. and Srinavasan, T. N. (1974). On reanalyzing the Harris-Todaro model:
policy rankings in the case of sector specific sticky wages. American Economic
Review. 64, 502-8.
Bhattacharya, B. (1985). The role of family decision in internal migration.  Journal of
Development Economics. 18(1), 51-66.
Bhattacharya, P. C. (1993). Rural-urban migration in economic development. Journal
of Economic Surveys. 7(3), 243-81.
Bhatia, K. B. (1979). Rural-urban migration and surplus labour. Oxford Economic
Papers. 31, 403-14.
Borjas, G. (1995). The economic benefits from immigration. Journal of Economic
Perspectives. 9(2), 3-22.
Caces, F., Arnold, F., Fawcett, J.T. and Gardner, R.W. (1985). Shadow households and
competing auspices: Migration behavior in the Philippines. Journal of Development
Economics. 18(1), 51-66.
S.M Turab Hussain/ CMER Working Paper No. 05-37
36Corden, W. M. and Findlay, R. (1975). Urban unemployment, intersectoral capital
mobility and development policy. Economica. 42, 59-78.
Fields, Gary. S, (2001). A welfare economic analysis of labor market policies in the
Harris-Todaro model. Working Paper SILR. Cornell University.
Gang, I. N. and Gangopadhyay, S. (1987). Optimal policies in a dual economy with
open unemployment and surplus labour. Oxford Economic Papers. 39, 378-387.
Gazdar, H.,  A review of migration issues in Pakistan Paper presented at the Regional
Conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia. 22–24
June 2003 in Dhaka, Bangladesh Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit,
Bangladesh/ DFID UK.
Ghatak, S., Levine, P., Price, W. S., (1996). Migration Theories and Evidence: An
assessment. Journal of Economic Surveys. 10. (2), 123-198.
Gupta, M. R, (1993). Rural-urban migration, informal sector and development policies:
A theoretical analysis. Journal of Development Economics. 41, 137-151.
Gupta, M. R, (1988). Migration, welfare, inequality and shadow wage. Oxford Economic
Papers. 40, 477-486.
Habitat (UNCHS). State of the World's Cities. 2001, http://www.unchs.org.
Harris, J. R. and Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development:
A two sector analysis. American Economic Review. 60, 126-42.
Karim, M.S and Nasar, A  (2003). Migration patterns and differentials in Pakistan. In
A.R. Kemal, Mohammad Irfan, and Naushin Mahmood (eds.), Population of
Pakistan: An Analysis of 1998 Population and Housing Census. Pakistan Institute
of Development Economics, Islamabad.
Kaufmann, D. and Lindauer, D. (1980). Basic needs, inter-household transactions and
the extended family. Urban and Regional Report No. 80-15, World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
Lahiri, S. and Gayton-Fregoso, H, (2000). Foreign aid and illegal immigration. Journal
of Development Economics. 63, 515-527.
Lewis, W. A. (1954). Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour.
Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies. 22, 139-91.
Lucas, R, E. and Stark, O, (1985). Motivations to remit: Evidence from Botswana.
Journal of Political Economy. 93, 901-18.
S.M Turab Hussain/ CMER Working Paper No. 05-37
37Mazumdar, D., (1976). The rural-urban wage gap, migration, and the shadow wage.
Oxford Economic Papers. 28(3), 406-425.
Nabi, I., Hamid, N. and Shahid, Z. (1986). The Agrarian Economy of Pakistan: Issues
and Policies. Oxford University Press, Karachi.
Selier, F. J. M., (1988). Rural-Urban Migration in Pakistan. Vanguard Books., Lahore.
Shukla, V. and Stark, O. (1990). Policy comparisons with an agglomeration effects
augmented dual economy model. Journal of Urban Economics. 27(1), 1-15.
Stark, O., (1991). The Migration of Labour. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
Todaro, M. P. (1969). A model of labour migration and urban unemployment in less
developed countries. The American Economic Review. 59 (1), 138-148.
Todaro, M. P., and Smith, S. C. (2003). Economic Development, 8th. Edition. Addison
Wesley.
Williamson, J. (1988). Migration and Urbanization, in H. Chenery and T. N. Srinavasan
(eds.). Handbook of Development Economics. I. Amsterdam: North Holland.
S.M Turab Hussain/ CMER Working Paper No. 05-37
38CMER Working Paper Series
2005
No. 05-43
Jawaid Abdul Ghani and Arif Iqbal Rana:
The Economics of Outsourcing in a
De-integrating Industry
No. 05-42
Ahmed M. Khalid and Muhammad N. Hanif:
Corporate Governance for Banks in Pakistan:
Recent Developments and Regional Comparisons
No. 05-41
Atif Ikram and Syed Ali Asjad Naqvi:
Family Business Groups and Tunneling
Framework: Application and Evidence from
Pakistan
No. 05-40
Junaid Ashraf and Waqar I. Ghani:
Accounting in a Country:
The Case of Pakistan
No. 05-39
Rasul Bakhsh Rais and Asif Saeed:
Regulatory Impact Assesment of SECP’s
Corporate Governance Code in Pakistan
No. 05-38
S.M. Turab Hussain:
Rural to Urban Migration and Network Effects
in an Extended Family Framework
No. 05-37
S.M. Turab Hussain:
Migration Policy, and Welfare in the Context of




Combed Cotton Yarn Exports of Pakistan to US:
A Dispute Settlement Case
No. 05-35
Waqar I. Ghani and Junaid Ashraf :
Corporate Governance, Business Group
Affiliation and Firm Performance:
Descriptive Evidence from Pakistan
No. 05-34
Abid A. Burki, Mushtaq A. Khan and Faisal Bari:








Syed Zahid Ali and Sajid Anwar:
Trade Liberalization Under New Realities
No. 04-31
Sikander A. Shah:
Mergers and the Rights of Minority
Shareholders in Pakistan
No. 04-30
Abid A. Burki and Mahmood-ul-Hasan Khan:
Effects of Allocative Inefficiency on Resource
Allocation and Energy Substitution in
Pakistan’s ManufacturingAbstract
After giving an overview of the state of migration policy in developing countries
with special reference to Pakistan this paper essentially revisits the issue of policy
and its effect on rural to urban migration under an extended family theoretical
framework. This specific approach is motivated by empirical literature on migration
in the context of developing countries which suggests the emergence of spatially
separated but economically linked rural and urban households - expanded or
extended families. The extended family in this paper consists of two households,
the rural-origin and its urban-migrant offshoot. The migrant after leaving the
countryside joins relatives in the city who through the assumption of income sharing
within households sustain the migrant in case of unemployment. The economic tie
linking the two households is remittances flowing from the migrants to the family
members left behind. All decisions, migration and remittance, are based on altruism
rather then self-interest. Thus in the model both migration and remittances are
endogenously determined. This extended family framework is then employed to
analyze the effect of the standard policy prescriptions, i.e., urban employment
subsidy and a rural income subsidy on migration and urban employment. Also, the
welfare effect of a subsidy transfer from urban to rural sector is analyzed. The
results, especially in the case of the rural subsidy provision, are qualitatively
different from those in the standard Harris-Todaro type literature on migration
suggesting the sensitivity of predicted policy effects on the type of methodology
employed.
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